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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature Of The Case
Jessie Trevino Salinas appeals from his judgment for possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver. On appeal, he argues only that the district court
abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On August 30, 2017, Detective Shane Murphy stopped Salinas after observing
him twice turn without using a signal and then drive with both passenger side tires over
the fog line for approximately one hundred feet. (R., pp.13-14.) After asking for Salinas’
license, registration, and insurance information, Detective Murphy returned to his vehicle
to check the information and fill out a citation for failure to maintain proof of insurance.
(R., p.14.) While he did so, another officer deployed a drug-detecting dog to perform a
free-air sniff around the vehicle. (Id.) The dog alerted and a search of the vehicle
recovered a syringe that appeared as though it had been recently used. (R., pp.14-15.)
After Detective Murphy advised Salinas of his Miranda 1 rights, Salinas admitted that the
syringe would test positive for methamphetamine but claimed that friends had left it in
his car. (R., p.15.) Salinas nevertheless admitted to having used methamphetamine about
six hours earlier. (Id.) He was released by Detective Murphy with a citation for failure
to maintain proof of insurance and advised that the syringe would be tested and charges
may be forthcoming based on the results. (Id.) Testing later confirmed the syringe
contained methamphetamine. (Id.)
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1

About three months after the initial traffic stop, Detective Murphy saw Salinas get
in a vehicle. (R., pp.16-17.) Detective Murphy believed he had probable cause to make
an arrest for felony possession of a controlled substance based on the previous traffic stop
and the results of testing the syringe. (Id.) After following the vehicle, Detective
Murphy and another officer turned on their emergency lights when the vehicle pulled into
a driveway. (R., p.17.) After arresting Salinas, Detective Murphy found a digital scale in
Salinas’ front pocket. (Id.) Salinas then stated that “‘everything in the car is mine she
[the driver] had nothing to do with it. It’s mine I put it there.’” (Id.) Detective Murphy
then informed Salinas of his Miranda rights, after which he asked Salinas what was in the
vehicle. (Id.) Salinas responded that “‘it’s right there by the console I put it there before
I got out.’” (Id.) Detective Murphy located several baggies of what appeared to be
methamphetamine next to the console.

(Id.)

Asked how much there was, Salinas

responded, “‘about a half ounce.’” (Id.) The substance in the baggies tested presumptive
positive as methamphetamine and weighed 16 grams. (R., p.18.)
Based on both the initial traffic stop during which the syringe was recovered and
the subsequent arrest during which the large quantity of methamphetamine was
recovered, Salinas was charged by information with felony possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver, felony possession of a controlled substance, and two
misdemeanor counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.33-36.) He was also
charged by information with an enhancement for a previous conviction under the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act. (R., pp.37-39.)
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Salinas agreed to plead guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver, in exchange for which the state would drop all other charges and the
enhancement and recommend a unified sentence of eight years with three years fixed.
(R., pp.45-47.) The plea agreement stated, “The Defendant understands that the State is
released from this agreement if he/she commits any new and additional criminal acts
prior to sentencing, or if he/she fails to attend all scheduled hearings without just cause.”
(R., pp.46-47.) Salinas completed a Guilty Plea Advisory and Form (R., pp.48-56) in
which he acknowledged that he was waiving all defenses (R., p.51). At a plea hearing,
Salinas admitted his guilt, and the district court found that there was a factual basis for
the plea and accepted it as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (Tr., p.5, L.3 – p.9, L.9;
R., pp.43-44.) The district court ordered a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) and
scheduled a sentencing hearing for April 23. (Tr., p.9, Ls.3-15; R., pp.42, 44.)
Less than two weeks later, the state sought to revoke Salinas’ release when he
tested positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines. (R., pp.57-63.) The district
court revoked the release (R., pp.64-65) and issued a warrant for Salinas’ arrest with a
$50,000 bond (R., p.66). Salinas failed to appear for his interview with the Presentence
Investigator several days later (R., p.67) and then failed to appear for the sentencing
hearing (R., p.68). When Salinas failed to appear for the sentencing hearing, the district
court issued a new warrant, this time with no bond. (R., pp.68-69.)
Salinas was arrested on the warrant three days later (R., p.75) by Detective
Murphy (PSI, pp.37-38). Detective Murphy, aware that Salinas had an active warrant,
pulled up next to Salinas as he walked, at which time Salinas fled on foot. (PSI, p.37.)
During the chase, Salinas threw 1.7 grams of a substance that later tested presumptive
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positive for methamphetamine, along with numerous clear baggies. (PSI, pp.37-38.) He
was charged in a separate criminal case with possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver; felony destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence; and resisting
and obstructing officers. (PSI, pp.37-38.) See also iCourt Portal, State v. Salinas, Cassia
County District Court Case No. CR16-18-02244. 2
Roughly a month later, and just over two weeks before the new date set for his
sentencing hearing (R., p.80), Salinas moved to withdraw his guilty plea (R., pp.81-83).
The motion claimed that there was just reason to do so because, “[o]ne of the principal
reasons” that Salinas was stopped by Detective Murphy in the initial traffic stop was that
Salinas “had crossed the fog line with his passenger tires,” but “[t]he Idaho Supreme
Court has now ruled that crossing the fog line does not give reasonable articulable
suspicion for a traffic stop.” (R., p.81.) Salinas further argued that he would like to
pursue a motion to suppress based on the claim that Detective Murphy delayed the initial
traffic stop in order to permit a drug dog to arrive at the scene. (R., pp.81-82.) Finally,
Salinas stated that he “was very reluctant to waive his defenses” at the time he submitted
his plea and with “time to assess his cases he therefore desires the Court to allow him to
withdraw his guilty plea.” (R., p.82.)
At a hearing on the motion, Salinas reiterated and expanded on these arguments.

2

He initially pleaded not guilty to all of those charges, but reached a plea agreement with
the state and, in August of 2018, changed his plea to guilty with respect to the felony
destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence charge. See iCourt Portal, State v.
Salinas, Cassia County District Court Case No. CR16-18-02244. The other charges were
dropped and Salinas was sentenced to a determinate term of three years to run
concurrently with his sentence in this matter. Id.
4

He claimed that “we just received a copy of the new Supreme Court decision State vs.
Antonia Kate Fuller [State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585, 416 P.3d 957 (2018)], where they
finally decided―which makes sense for a change―that crossing the white fog line does
not give articulable suspicion to pull somebody over.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.9-17.) Salinas then
cited a variety of additional issues that he now wanted to raise on a motion to suppress.
He suggested that Detective Murphy improperly waited to pull him over after he made
two turns without using a signal (Tr., p.14, Ls.10-13); that police mishandled the syringe
found in his vehicle by destroying it, failing to take pictures of it, and merely testing its
contents (Tr., p.14, L.23 – p.15, L.1); that police improperly arrested Salinas without first
securing an arrest warrant after the results of testing the syringe returned (Tr., p.15, Ls.211); and that police delayed the traffic stop so that a drug-detecting dog could be brought
to the scene (Tr., p. 20, Ls.10-15). According to Salinas, “He waived and gave up all of
these defenses that he had, and some of those would be just cause to give him a chance to
come back.” (Tr., p.16, Ls.12-14.) “After he’s had a chance to sit and think about all
this―it was difficult to him to enter a plea agreement, and it was not one of the best plea
agreements we’ve ever come up with, but we were kind of that’s where we had to go.”
(Tr., p.16, Ls.14-18.) He “took it, but he regrets it.” (Tr., p.16, Ls.18-19.) While Salinas
acknowledged that he missed a pre-sentence investigation appointment, “in this particular
case, there’s just enough there that he probably in the interest of justice should be able to
argue these points in a motion to suppress, rather than be stuck with his plea, where he
entered a waiver of those defenses.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.5-9.)
The district court issued a memorandum decision denying the motion. (R., pp.8793.) It first concluded that Salinas’ guilty plea was given knowingly, intelligently, and

5

voluntarily. (R., p.89.) It next concluded that a mere desire to “exercise rights that have
been waived is insufficient reason to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea.” (R., p.91.)
As to Fuller, the district court concluded that its issuance did not provide just reason to
permit Salinas to withdraw his guilty plea because Fuller merely clarified law that existed
at the time Salinas entered his plea and, at any rate, did not clearly support any motion to
suppress, particularly in light of the fact that the traffic stop was independently justified
by Salinas’ failure to use turn signals. (R., p.91.) Finally, the district court recognized
that Salinas received information regarding his probable sentence when he failed to
attend his sentencing hearing, thereby relieving the state of its obligations under the plea
agreement and permitting the court to “temper its liberality in the exercise of discretion.”
(R., pp.91-92.)
At sentencing, the state relied on both Salinas’ failure to appear at the initial
sentencing hearing and on his post-plea, pre-sentencing criminal conduct to recommend a
sentence exceeding what they agreed to recommend in the plea agreement. (Tr., p.24,
L.10 – p.25, L.3.) Salinas acknowledged that the state was relieved of its obligations
under the plea agreement. (Tr., p.25, Ls.10-14.)
Salinas timely filed a notice of appeal. (R., pp.100-02.)

6

ISSUES

Salinas states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Salinas’ motion
to withdraw his guilty plea?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Salinas failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion When It Denied Salinas’ Motion To
Withdraw His Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
The district court recognized the discretionary nature of its determination and the

applicable legal standards.

(R., pp.88-89.)

standards and by an exercise of reason.

It then acted in accordance with those
That Salinas regrets having knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily waived his defenses does not constitute just reason to permit
him to withdraw his plea. Nor does the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Fuller, 163 Idaho 585, 416 P.3d 957 (2018), where that decision was merely a
clarification of existing law and would not have provided a basis for a meritorious motion
to suppress in any event. Finally, the district court was permitted to temper its liberality
in evaluating Salinas’ motion because he was aware of information regarding his
probable sentence―his own post-plea behavior.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review on appeal in cases where a defendant has attempted to

withdraw a guilty plea is whether the district court has properly exercised judicial
discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action.” State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 483,
861 P.2d 51, 53 (1993).

C.

Salinas Failed To Establish Just Reason To Withdraw His Plea
Where, as here, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made prior to sentencing,

“the defendant must show a just reason for withdrawing the plea.” State v. Flowers, 150
Idaho 568, 571, 249 P.3d 367, 370 (2011). “If he does so, then the State may avoid the
8

granting of the motion by showing that prejudice would result if the plea were
withdrawn.” Id. “The threshold ‘just reason’ requirement is a [sic] ‘not an onerous
burden. It is a reasonable requirement, to be administered liberally and with due
recognition of the serious consequences attending a guilty plea.’” State v. Baxter, 163
Idaho 231, 234, 409 P.3d 811, 814 (2018) (quoting State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 804,
761 P.2d 1151, 1156 (1988)). “The defendant’s failure to present and support a plausible
reason will dictate against granting withdrawal, even absent prejudice to the
prosecution.” State v. Hartsock, 160 Idaho 639, 641, 377 P.3d 1102, 1104 (Ct. App.
2016).
On appeal, Salinas contends that because he was “reluctant” to waive his defenses
when he did and, “with further consideration of case law,” including Fuller, now wants to
assert them, the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. (Appellant’s brief, p.11. 3) Salinas is incorrect; the district court acted well

3

Salinas gestures at an additional argument: “In this case, the district court placed too
onerous a burden on Mr. Salinas when he sought to withdraw his plea at this stage of the
proceedings. Mr. Salinas was not required to show his plea was not knowing, intelligent,
or voluntary―the just reason standard does not require that the defendant establish a
constitutional defect in his or her guilty plea.” (Appellant’s brief, p.11.) This suggestion
is puzzling because Salinas cites nothing to support the view that the district court held or
implied that the just reason standard requires the defendant to establish a constitutional
defect in the plea. The district court evaluated whether Salinas’ plea was given
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, but did so because “[t]he first step in analyzing
a motion to withdraw a plea is to determine whether the plea was constitutionally valid,
which requires the plea to have been ‘knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.’”
(R., p.89 (quoting State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 536, 211 P.3d 775, 781 (Ct. App.
2008).) “If the plea is constitutionally valid, the court must then determine whether there
are any other just reasons for withdrawal of the plea.” Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536, 211
P.3d at 781. The district court did exactly that, concluding that Salinas failed to provide a
just reason to withdraw the plea, not that he was required to show that the plea was
constitutionally inadequate. (R., pp.89-92.) If Salinas is suggesting that the district court
mistakenly held or implied that only constitutionally inadequate pleas can be withdrawn,
there is no support for that proposition.
9

within its discretion in denying his motion.

1.

Salinas’ Regret Regarding His Plea Does Not Constitute Just Reason To
Withdraw It

Idaho’s appellate courts have repeatedly rejected the view that a mere desire to
assert defenses that were waived through a valid guilty plea constitutes just reason to
withdraw the plea. See, e.g,. Dopp, 124 Idaho at 486, 861 P.2d at 56 (“[W]ithdrawal is
not an automatic right and more substantial reasons than just asserting legal innocence
must be given.”). “‘A guilty plea frequently involves the making of difficult judgments.
Were withdrawal automatic in every case where the defendant decided to alter his tactics
and present his theory of the case to the jury, the guilty plea would become a mere
gesture, a temporary and meaningless formality reversible at the defendant’s whim.’”
State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 960, 801 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Ct. App. 1990) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208,
221 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). See also Hartsock, 160 Idaho at 642, 377 P.3d at 1105 (finding no
just reason to withdraw plea where movant “offered no reason why her pronouncement of
innocence was not previously maintained and did not provide sufficient basis for her
requested withdrawal of her plea beyond a profession of innocence and regret”).
Below, Salinas cited a variety of arguments that he would now like to make in a
motion to suppress, which desire allegedly constitutes just reason for withdrawing his
plea, including: that his crossing of the fog line did not provide reasonable articulable
suspicion for the initial traffic stop (Tr., p.12, Ls.9-17); that Detective Murphy
improperly waited to pull him over after he made two turns without using a signal (Tr.,
p.14, Ls.10-13); that police delayed the traffic stop so that a drug-detecting dog could be
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brought to the scene (Tr., p. 20, Ls.10-15); that police mishandled the syringe found in
his vehicle by destroying it, failing to take pictures of it, and merely testing its contents
(Tr., p.14, L.23 – p.15, L.1); and that police improperly arrested Salinas without first
securing an arrest warrant after the results of testing the syringe returned (Tr., p.15, Ls.211). On appeal, Salinas refers only to the issue whether crossing the fog line provided
reasonable articulable suspicion and the issue whether the traffic stop was delayed to
allow a drug-detecting dog to arrive. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.)
But for the issue whether crossing the fog line provided reasonable articulable
suspicion for the initial traffic stop, Salinas has not provided any explanation on appeal or
below why these issues―including whether the stop was delayed so that a drug-detecting
dog could arrive―were not addressed prior to entering a plea and voluntarily waiving
them. As the district court noted at the hearing on Salinas’ motion, “those [alleged]
defects were known at the time of the plea.” (Tr., p.20, Ls.7-9.) Indeed, Salinas stated
below that “these were all things we were arguing and discussing back at the time when
he took the deal.” (Tr., p.20, Ls.16-18.) On appeal, Salinas merely claims that the
district court should have granted his motion because of “his belief that he had viable
defenses to his charges, including a viable motion to suppress,” which belief has caused
him to regret his plea. (Appellant’s brief, p.6. See also Tr., p.16, Ls.18-19 (arguing
before the district court that he should be able to withdraw his plea because while he
“took it, . . . he regrets it”).) The district court correctly held that the mere desire to raise
defenses that were available at the time of and voluntarily relinquished in a plea does not
constitute just reason to withdraw the plea. (R., pp.90, 92.)
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Finally, Salinas suggests that “the district court entirely failed to address the other
basis for the suppression motion [other than the fog line issue]―that the officers delayed
the duration of the traffic stop to allow additional time for the drug dog to arrive.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.) The district court did address that alleged basis for a motion
to suppress when it held that “the desire to exercise rights that have been waived is
insufficient reason to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea.” (R., p.91.) Though the
district court did not consider some specific reason Salinas did not previously pursue a
motion to suppress based on any alleged delay in the traffic stop, it did not do so because
Salinas never offered any reason for the district court to consider and has still not done so
on appeal.

2.

The District Court Correctly Held That The Issuance Of State v. Fuller
Does Not Provide Just Reason To Permit Salinas To Withdraw His Plea

Salinas’ only attempt to provide anything more than regret as justification to
withdraw his plea involves the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Fuller, 163
Idaho 585, 416 P.3d 957 (2018), which was filed on April 26, 2018, roughly two months
after he entered his plea (R., pp.43-44) and a little over a month before he moved to
withdraw it (R., pp.81-83). (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) As the district court found, that
decision does not provide just reason to permit Salinas to withdraw his plea both because
it did not reflect a change in the law and because it does not provide a basis for a viable
motion to suppress. (R., pp.91-92.)
As an initial matter, Salinas cites no case law on appeal and cited no case law
below, either from Idaho or from other jurisdictions, to support the view that a change in
the law might constitute just reason to withdraw a guilty plea. There are some such
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cases. A number of courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is just reason to
withdraw a plea “when a subsequent change in the law were such that the conduct was no
longer a crime.” State v. Andrews, 236 P.3d 574, 576 (Mont. 2010). See also United
States v. Andrade, 83 F.3d 729, 731 (5th Cir. 1996) (“A plea of guilty typically waives all
non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings below. Nonetheless, in this particular
context, where intervening law has established that a defendant’s actions do not
constitute a crime and thus that the defendant is actually innocent of the charged offense,
application of this rule is misplaced.” (internal citations omitted)). But Salinas does not
argue that a change in the law rendered legal the conduct to which he pleaded guilty, only
that new case law provided some modicum of support for a motion to suppress evidence.
But see Andrews, 236 P.3d at 576-77 (affirming district court conclusion that there was
no just reason to withdraw a guilty plea where a change in the law was allegedly relevant
only to a prospective motion to suppress, not to whether the conduct at issue was
criminal).
Even assuming that a change in the law relevant only to a potential motion to
suppress might, in some circumstances, provide just reason to withdraw a guilty plea,
Fuller does not provide just reason here. That is so for two reasons, both of which were
recognized by the district court.
First, the district court recognized that Fuller is a “clarification of State v. Neal,”
not a change in the law that would justify resurrecting a defense that was voluntarily
surrendered. (R., p.91.) In Neal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that “driving onto but not
across the line marking the right edge of the road” did not provide reasonable articulable
suspicion that the driver violated Idaho Code section 49-637 by failing to drive entirely

13

within a single lane of traffic. State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 447, 362 P.3d 514, 522
(2015).

In Fuller, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the closely related question

whether crossing the fog line―not merely touching it―provided reasonable articulable
suspicion that the driver failed to drive entirely within a single lane of traffic. Fuller, 163
Idaho at 587-88, 416 P.3d at 959-60. Fuller held that it did not, relying wholly on its
decision in Neal. Id. at 589-90, 416 P.3d at 961-62. As the Court noted in Fuller, Neal
“was careful to emphasize that the fog line is not a lane barrier” and the Court’s holdings
in Neal and Fuller followed directly from that conclusion. Id. at 589, 416 P.3d at 961
(emphasis in original).

Because the fog line is not a lane barrier, “Neal was

unequivocally clear that an isolated incident of touching the fog line does not violate
section 49-637(1).” Id. at 590, 416 P.3d at 962. “And given that the fog line does not
signify a formal lane barrier, an isolated incident of temporarily crossing the fog line
likewise does not violate section 49-637(1).” Id. Fuller did not announce a change in the
law, but only made the determination that the district court “correctly applied Neal.” Id.
As the district court noted at the hearing on Salinas’ motion, Fuller merely applied
Neal, which “was in force when he [Salinas] entered the plea.” (Tr., p.15, Ls.12-15.)
Salinas cites no authority for the proposition that a change in the law may constitute just
reason to withdraw a plea, and he certainly cites no authority for the proposition that a
decision merely affirming the correct application of existing law may do so. Fuller
provides no justification for Salinas’ failure to pursue his defenses before waiving them
through a plea agreement.
Second, Fuller would not provide a basis for a motion to suppress in any event.
Detective Murphy’s Affidavit of Probable Cause stated that Salinas twice turned without
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using his signal prior to the traffic stop (R., p.13), which the district court concluded
“provid[ed] an obvious independent basis for the stop” (R., p.91). Salinas argues that
Fuller provides just reason to withdraw his plea because it would support a motion to
suppress. It does not provide a just reason to permit the withdrawal of Salinas’ plea
because it would not affect the outcome of any prospective motion to suppress.
Salinas protests that the district court was “merely speculating after reading the
probable cause affidavit as to what facts would be introduced at such a hearing [on a
motion to suppress].” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) The district court was not speculating, but
was relying on Detective Murphy’s sworn statement. “The burden rests on the defendant
to demonstrate a justification for withdrawal of the guilty plea.” State v. Stone, 147
Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009). Where support for the motion
requires the submission of evidence and the defendant fails to submit any, the motion is
properly denied. Id. (affirming denial of motion to withdraw plea where defendant’s
motion was “utterly unsupported by any evidence”). To the extent that the merits of
Salinas’ motion turned on evidentiary considerations, it was his obligation to provide
evidence in support of the motion. Salinas submitted no evidence, did not testify, and
made no attempt to contradict any of the sworn statements in Detective Murphy’s
affidavit. The district court was entitled to rely on the evidence before it in ruling on
Salinas’ motion to withdraw his plea.

3.

The District Court Properly Considered Salinas’ Motives For Bringing
The Motion And Tempered Its Liberality In Determining Whether There
Was Just Reason To Withdraw The Plea

District courts are generally encouraged to “liberally exercise” discretion in
granting motions to withdraw guilty pleas made before sentencing. Hartsock, 160 Idaho
15

at 641, 377 P.3d at 1104. But “the district court may temper its liberality by weighing the
defendant’s apparent motive” if the motion is made “after the defendant has learned of
the content of the PSI or has received other information about the probable sentence.” Id.
“Furthermore, the good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant’s assertions in
support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to decide.” State
v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 537, 211 P.3d 775, 782 (Ct. App. 2008). Even if the
district court was not entitled to “temper its liberality,” it properly denied Salinas’ motion
where Salinas failed to provide any just reason for withdrawing his plea. See State v.
Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 139, 765 P.2d 162, 164 (Ct. App. 1988) (affirming denial of
motion to withdraw plea and holding that it was unnecessary to determine whether the
district court properly tempered its liberality by weighing the defendant’s apparent
motive where the defendant’s only reason for attempting to withdraw the plea was a
desire to exercise rights that had been voluntarily waived). But the district court’s
determination to deny Salinas’ motion was supported by well-founded concerns
regarding Salinas’ apparent motives for attempting to withdraw his plea, which concerns
appropriately led the district court to “temper its liberality” in evaluating his motion.
Though Salinas’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea was made before the PSI was
issued, Salinas knew of three facts that developed after his plea but before his motion that
were likely to affect his sentence: (1) he failed to attend his sentencing hearing (R., p.6869); (2) he was arrested for additional criminal conduct (PSI, pp.37-38); and, (3) he failed
a drug test that was a condition of his release (R., pp.57-67). His plea agreement
provided that “the State is released from this agreement if [Salinas] commits any new and
additional criminal acts prior to sentencing, or if [Salinas] fails to attend all scheduled
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court hearings without just cause.” (R., pp.46-47.) The district court focused on Salinas’
failure to attend his sentencing hearing, noted that the state was relieved of its obligations
under the plea agreement, and concluded that Salinas had therefore “received other
information regarding the probable sentence” permitting the court to “temper its liberality
in the exercise of discretion.” (R., p.92.) The district court concluded that Salinas “pled
guilty because he made a rational and tactical decision to enter a plea, which he may now
regret because of his actions vitiating the agreement.” (Id.)
Salinas responds on appeal by suggesting that, though he “suspected that the State
would not be bound by the plea agreement,” the district court had not determined whether
Salinas had just cause for his failure to attend the sentencing hearing, and so had not
determined that the state was relieved of its obligations under the plea agreement, and the
state had not indicated that it would recommend a sentence other than the one it agreed to
recommend in the plea agreement even if it was released from its obligations.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-11.) He suggests that, as a result, the district court’s conclusion
that Salinas was aware of information about his probable sentence was improperly based
on speculation. (Id.)
To permit the district court to temper its liberality in considering Salinas’ motion,
it needed only find that Salinas had some information regarding his probable sentence,
not that he had information regarding what the sentence would certainly be. Information
regarding a probable sentence need not be information that it is certain to affect the
eventual sentence. See State v. Baxter, 163 Idaho 231, 235-36, 409 P.3d 811, 815-16
(2018) (holding that new charges, which relieved the state of its obligations under plea
agreement, constituted information regarding probable sentence); State v. Litz, 122 Idaho
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387, 389, 834 P.2d 904, 906 (Ct. App. 1992) (affirming denial of motion to withdraw
plea where motion was based on defendant’s belief that the state would request a
sentence more severe than the sentence set out in plea agreement violated by defendant);
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 61, 106 P.3d 376, 387 (2004) (holding that defendant’s
“motives for requesting the motion [to withdraw guilty plea] would have been suspect”
where defendant learned of adverse testimony that would be presented at sentencing
hearing).
At the hearing on Salinas’ motion, the state clearly suggested that it would be
recommending a sentence more severe than that in the plea agreement and questioned
Salinas’ motives for requesting to withdraw his plea. (Tr., p.18, L.23 – p.19, L.25 (noting
that the “ultimate issue” was that Salinas failed a drug test and failed to attend his
sentencing hearing, that the state was therefore relieved of any obligations under the plea
agreement, permitting the state to recommend a more severe sentence and providing
Salinas an “alternative motive” to request to withdraw his guilty plea).) Salinas did not
respond to this argument except to say, “Yes, he missed going to the PSI Interview the
first time.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.4-9.) He did not offer any “just cause” for failing to attend the
sentencing hearing, did not contend that the state was still obligated under the plea
agreement, and later conceded at the rescheduled sentencing hearing that the state was
relieved of its obligations. (Tr., p.25, Ls.10-14 (“Well, the State was released from its
obligation when he failed to appear for his PSI interview.”).)
The district court properly made credibility determinations and evaluated the
evidence before it to form a judgment about Salinas’ apparent motives for attempting to
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withdraw his plea. It was entitled to do so. See Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at
782.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s order denying
Salinas’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
DATED this 1st day of February, 2019.
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